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THE CONUNDRUM OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Cally Jordan∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
t has become a truism that the pressures of the capital 
markets will improve the governance of corporations; 
equally, that improvements in corporate governance will pro-
mote development of the capital markets.  However, the rela-
tionship of the capital markets to the governance of corpora-
tions is neither simple nor linear; rather it is more in the nature 
of a complex feedback loop, a dynamic process responsive to 
many factors. 
The efforts to identify the factors which promote capital mar-
ket development and improvements in corporate governance 
have spawned a huge body of literature.  Central to the dis-
course has been the role of legal systems and legal rules.  The 
popularity and proliferation of international standards, among 
other factors, have resulted in massive transfers of legal infor-
mation, but often the relative ineffectiveness of transplanted 
legal rules has proved a conundrum. 
This article builds on previous literature looking at how to 
predict the effectiveness of transplanted legal concepts and the 
implications for corporate governance initiatives and capital 
market development.  The recent economics literature has ig-
nored the complexity and dynamism of legal systems.  More 
tellingly, the “legal origins” literature has misunderstood the 
fundamental nature of the benchmark U.S. legal system, the 
genius of which, according to some commentators, resides in its 
combination of elements of both the common law and the civil 
law traditions. 
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So, more discernment is needed in introducing new legal con-
cepts, particularly in what are now sometimes referred to as 
“frontier economies,” as well as greater attention being paid to 
the essential process of “indigenization.”  Even the form a legal 
rule takes can be as important as its substance.  Indiscriminate 
mixing and matching of legal rules, such as that occurring in 
the aftermath of mass privatizations that marked the 1990s, 
can easily go awry.  The result may be dysfunctional or unbal-
anced systems with unpredictable, and certainly unintended, 
consequences.  At worst, perversities may occur, for example, 
where a deliberately ineffective rule is introduced domestically, 
seemingly in furtherance of the implementation of internation-
ally recognized standards. 
Adding to the complexity of the operation of formal legal rules 
is another complex layer, “legal sensibilities,” an often ignored 
but essential element to the effectiveness of any legal rule. Fi-
duciary duties, for example, one of the cornerstones of Anglo-
American corporate governance, are imbued with the legal sen-
sibilities of a particular time and place and may travel badly, if 
at all, to other climes.  
These observations may have some predictive value in gaug-
ing the potential effectiveness of any particular initiative.  
“Voluntary” codes and procedural remedies drawn from Anglo-
American law, for example, may not be the most effective 
means of channeling market forces to the improvement of the 
governance of corporations in continental European-style legal 
systems.  Governance mechanisms introduced in multiple 
guises along a continuum of private and public rule may am-
plify the prospects of effectiveness. 
Finally, new models for markets and capital markets regula-
tion are emerging in Europe, models that may be more com-
patible with the legal systems of much of the non-
Commonwealth world. 
II. THE DEBATE 
The events of the last fifteen years rival the South Sea Bub-
ble and tulip mania in focusing popular attention on capital 
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markets and corporations.1  There have been spectacular mar-
ket surges and market failures accompanied by a panoply of 
regulatory and private sector responses.  The intensity of the 
activity and its consequences have raised fundamental ques-
tions as to how capital markets, and financial systems gener-
ally, grow and develop and the role of corporate actors. 
The efforts to identify the factors which promote capital mar-
ket development and improvements in corporate governance 
have spawned a huge body of literature.  Central to the dis-
course has been the role of legal systems and legal rules.  Are 
some legal systems better than others in fostering financial sec-
tor development?2  Can formal legal rules from such systems be 
transplanted to other systems to promote better corporate gov-
ernance and the development of capital markets?3  Will there be 
inevitable convergence of the rules of “weaker” legal systems to 
those of “stronger” legal systems?4  Can international standards 
  
 1. The recent 2004 release THE CORPORATION, a film by Mark Achbar, 
Jennifer Abbott & Joel Bakan, is an indication of the degree to which the de-
bate has entered popular culture. 
 2. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 
(1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 
58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Cor-
porate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2001).  More recently, see LA PORTA ET AL., 
WHAT WORKS IN SECURITIES LAWS? (Tuck School of Bus., Working Paper No. 
03-22, July 16, 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=425880 (last 
visited May 20, 2005).  The legal origins literature referred to in this article is 
primarily based on the La Porta studies: 
Because legal origins are highly correlated with the content of the 
law, and because legal families originated before financial markets 
had developed, it is unlikely that laws were written primarily in re-
sponse to market pressures.  Rather the legal families appear to 
shape the legal rules, which in turn influence financial mar-
kets…legal rules do matter. 
La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, at 3.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the literature, see Katharina Pistor et al., The 
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 791 (2002).  
 3. See KATHARINA PISTOR, PATTERNS OF LEGAL CHANGE: SHAREHOLDER AND 
CREDITOR RIGHTS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, Working Paper No. 49, May 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=214654 (last visited May 
20, 2005).  
 4. For discussions of the convergence theory, see William W. Bratton & 
Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of 
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be formulated to provide guidance to developing and transition 
economies, and if so, based on what?5  And, the conundrum of 
corporate governance, why are “good” legal rules so often inef-
fective? 
There are still more questions than answers: 
  
the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 212 (1999).  Cf. JOHN C. COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS: 
A PATH DEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE 17 (Colum. Law School, Ctr. for Law and 
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 192, Apr. 2002), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/law-economicstudies/papers/wp192.pdf (last 
visited May 20, 2005); John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for 
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 N.W. U. 
L. REV. 641 (1999).  In addition, Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe have re-
cently published a collection of papers on the convergence debate in 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004). 
 5. Both the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have been active in formulating influential standards in the area of 
capital markets and corporate governance.  See, e.g., IOSCO, Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation, May 2003, available at http://www. 
iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) (revising 
the 1998 Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and used exten-
sively by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in their pro-
gram of country Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), 
which have been conducted in  dozens of  countries to date); IOSCO, Interna-
tional Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by 
Foreign Issuers, Sept. 1998, available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/ 
pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) (which have formed the basis 
of both U.S. S.E.C. and E.U. regulatory initiatives); OECD, Principles of Cor-
porate Governance, 2004 revision, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd 
/32/18/31557724.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) (also used extensively in the 
ROSC exercises). 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were endorsed by the 
OECD Ministers in 1999 and have since become an international 
benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other 
stakeholders worldwide.  They have advanced the corporate govern-
ance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regu-
latory initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries.  The Fi-
nancial Stability Forum has designated the Principles as one of the 
12 key standards for sound financial systems.  The Principles also 
provide the basis for an extensive programme of co-operation between 
the OECD and non-OECD countries and underpin the corporate gov-
ernance component of World Bank/IMF Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC). 
Id. at 3.  
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In these globalizing times, corporate law’s leading question is 
whether one or another national corporate governance system 
(or component thereof) possesses relative competitive advan-
tage . . . . Unfortunately, even as these descriptions become 
thicker and more cogent, answers to the bottom-line questions 
respecting competitive advantage have become more elusive 
and convergence predictions have become more qualified.6 
Amid the thicket of discourse, speculation and experimentation 
on corporate governance and capital market development, a few 
guideposts peek through.  Legal rules and legal families do mat-
ter.7  Political structures matter.8  History matters.9  Legal rules 
can be more or less resistant to change.10  Forces of convergence 
and divergence operate selectively on legal rules.11  Legal sys-
  
 6. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 213  
(“Related questions about competitive advantage and convergence to 
best practice come up in domestic policy discussions in many coun-
tries.  Concerns about local firms’ performance in international mar-
kets turns attention to alternative governance practices identified in 
international comparisons:  If competitive advantage lies elsewhere, 
then domestic practice should be reformed to follow the international 
leader.  An extensive body of studies addresses these questions, iden-
tifying and evaluating national variations in management and finan-
cial practices, industrial organization, and corporate and securities 
laws.”). 
 7. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Govern-
ance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (2000).  
 8. RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE GREAT REVERSALS: THE 
POLITICS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY 1–72 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8178, 2001). 
 9. On the effect of the manner in which legal rules are introduced into a 
system, e.g., by conquest, colonization, etc., see PISTOR, supra note 3;  DANIEL 
BERKOWITZ ET AL., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LEGALITY, AND THE TRANSPLANT 
EFFECT (Davidson Inst., U. Mich., Working Paper No. 410, Sept. 2001), avail-
able at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/Workingpapers/ 
wdi/wp410.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005). 
 10. See generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & MARK J. ROE, A THEORY OF PATH 
DEPENDENCE IN CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE (Colum. Law School, 
Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper, No. 131, 1999), reprinted in 
52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES 
MARKETS, supra note 4. 
 11. Cally Jordan, Experimentation in Capital Markets Regulation, Presen-
tation at the International Organization of Securities Commission’s (IOSCO) 
Seminar Training Program (Oct. 25, 2000). 
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tems are systems and legal concepts are not indiscriminately 
interchangeable components.12 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer 
and Robert Vishny (LLSV), in an influential series of papers, 
turned the spotlight on the relationship of legal rules and de-
velopment of financial markets, the so-called “legal origins” lit-
erature.  LLSV looked to the two main legal traditions in devel-
oped economies, the Anglo-American common law tradition and 
the continental European “civil” or Romano-Germanic legal tra-
dition, to conclude that the level of legal enforcement and the 
origin of the rules correlated to the level of development of both 
equity and debt markets.13  Measures of investor protection ap-
peared superior in common law countries and translated into 
more vibrant equity markets, they surmised from their find-
ings.14 
The implication, that common law systems are superior in 
fostering sophisticated financial systems, was bound to sow con-
troversy and did not go long unchallenged:15 
First, it does not seem that legal or cultural impediments to 
financial development are as serious as one might have con-
cluded from recent literature.  Somewhat facetiously, one does 
not have to have the good fortune of being colonized by the 
British to be able to have vibrant financial markets.  However, 
the main impediment we identify—the political structure 
within the country—can be as difficult to overcome as more 
structural impediments.16 
Both lines of thought are significant and not necessarily incom-
patible; each identifies a major determinant in the functioning 
of financial markets, the legal rules or, more precisely, the legal 
family or tradition to which they belong, and the political struc-
tures which create, support, or possibly, undermine them.  Le-
  
 12. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 215; Cally Jordan, Law Mat-
ters: Corporate Governance Legal Reforms in Asia and Their Implications for 
the ECA Countries, Presentation at the World Bank (Sept. 27, 2000), avail-
able at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/corpgov/eastasia/core_pdfs/jordan_law 
matters.ppt (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 13. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4. 
 14. Cf. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 228–30. 
 15. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 8. 
 16. Id. at 7. 
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gal rules or, more precisely again, statutory law, are the prod-
uct of and dependent upon political action. 
This debate, and the related one of convergence or divergence 
in corporate governance systems, caught the eye of Katharina 
Pistor, then a legal scholar at the Max Planck Institute in 
Hamburg.  Proponents of both a convergence theory and a di-
vergence (or path dependency) theory “regard legal institutions 
as important for promoting or hindering convergence, but differ 
in their assessment of the propensity of a particular body of 
law, such as corporate law, to achieve this goal.”17  Pistor’s con-
clusion:  “a simple convergence story does not do justice to the 
complexity of legal change.”18 
Obviously intrigued by the complexity of legal change, Pistor 
has gone on to look at “legal transplants” or the “transplant ef-
fect” in corporate law and the relative effectiveness of hybridi-
zation.19  How do legal concepts from one system fare when 
transplanted to another?  Her conclusion here is that the man-
ner of transplantation of a legal concept is significant. The ex-
tent to which a “foreign” legal concept has been voluntarily in-
troduced or embraced (as opposed to imposed, for political or 
other reasons), is a predictor of effectiveness.20 
  
 17. See PISTOR, supra note 3, at 4 
(“There is a lively debate in the corporate governance literature about 
these alternative patterns of institutional development and in par-
ticular about the role of law for convergence or divergence of corpo-
rate governance systems.  Proponents of the divergence, or path de-
pendence, hypothesis argue that even if the corporate law was har-
monized across countries, other legal rules (tax laws, codetermination 
legislation etc.) and institution constraints (financial structure, exist-
ing ownership structure of firms), or simply political considerations 
would stand in the way of convergence.  The opposite view holds that 
convergence is likely to take place, once the main regulatory obstacles 
are removed.  The economic forces towards success, they suggest, are 
the same all over the world.”). 
 18. Id. at 46. 
 19. BERKOWITZ ET AL., supra note 9. 
 20. Id.  There is a rich comparative literature on legal transplants and the 
process of “reception” of non-indigenous legal concepts.  See Pierre Legrand, 
The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 111 
(1997). 
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III. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:  
“IDEAS HAVE WINGS”21 
The promotion of “international standards” in both capital 
markets and corporate governance has contributed to the pro-
liferation of legal transplants. Dozens of international stan-
dards are being proposed (and, arguably, imposed) in financial 
sectors around the world.22  The popularity of international 
standards is often taken as an important indicator of the inevi-
table, and desirable, convergence of legal rules.  The pressures 
to conform to “international standards” can be attributed to a 
number of factors:  heavy promotion by the international finan-
cial institutions and development agencies such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the allure of “brand 
name” legal solutions, and the influence of the LLSV literature 
(which correlates common law systems to more highly devel-
oped financial markets).  The attractive simplicity of some in-
ternational standards may also explain their popularity; 
pitched at a level of generality, they are readily accessible.  A 
casual perusal of the OECD Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance23 has created many an instant expert. 
However, international standards have not been picked out of 
thin air.  Their legal origins can be traced back to national sys-
  
 21.  
Ideas have wings.  No legal system of significance has been able to 
claim freedom from foreign inspiration.  Roman law “borrowed” from 
Greek law, Greek law from the laws of Crete and Egypt.  The com-
mercial usages of the flourishing city states of medieval Italy have 
laid the foundations of modern mercantile law….There is, therefore, 
nothing extraordinary about the adoption of “foreign” legal ideas, doc-
trines and even whole codes. 
H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS 
BACKGROUND 484 (1973). 
 22. See Cally Jordan & Giovanni Majnoni, Financial Regulatory Harmoni-
zation and the Globalization of Finance, in GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, at 259, 274–75 
(“[T]he proliferation of international standards and codes may exemplify the 
lack of coordination that often precludes ‘first-best’ approaches to market 
regulation.  The establishment of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was 
specifically directed toward preventing such an outcome.  As of February 2000 
the FSF had identified 43 different codes and was considering 23 more for 
inclusion.”). 
 23. See supra note 5. 
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tems and, in capital markets and corporate governance, pre-
dominantly common law ones.  In many economies, both devel-
oped and developing, adoption of a current international stan-
dard may also entail, explicitly or implicitly, adoption of foreign 
legal concepts, or legal transplants, as well.  Some transplants 
may thrive; others may be so incompatible with the underlying 
legal system as to never take root. 
Gauging the effectiveness of these burgeoning international 
standards, and the extent of convergence of national legal sys-
tems to them, however is no easy matter.  “[T]he empirical evi-
dence that links indicators of efficiency and stability to the legal 
and regulatory framework has been based on indicators that 
have only an indirect relationship with the degree of compliance 
with international standards and codes.”24  The tenuous rela-
tionship between the adoption of international standards and 
the effectiveness of the legal rules embedded in them deepens 
the conundrum of corporate governance: 
It may be more useful for countries with very small, illiquid 
stock markets, to assess the conditions for establishing re-
gional markets or for firms to access liquid foreign markets 
rather than to assess national compliance with IOSCO stan-
dards that reflect the experience of regulators with markets of 
average size and liquidity.25 
  
 24. Jordan & Majnoni, supra note 22, at 275 
(“A serious difficulty that dogs efforts of coordination of standards 
and codes is the relative absence of empirical evidence demonstrating 
a relationship between compliance with standards and financial sta-
bility.  The initial evidence that linked indicators of legal and regula-
tory structure to the stability of banking and financial systems is 
based on very aggregate indicators of structure.  Only recently new 
empirical work has started to test the nature of relationship of spe-
cific and more detailed specification of regulatory structures with fi-
nancial development and stability.”).  
 25. Id. at 274 (“One of the weaknesses of the standards and codes approach 
and of its operational legs (the FSAP and the Report on Observance of Stan-
dards and Codes programs) is to consider small, emerging economies as Lilli-
putian replicas of large, industrialized ones.”).  As Majnoni commented in a  
prior version of this paper, “In keeping with literary analogies, a more appro-
priate perspective might be that of Saint Exupery’s Petit Prince whose major 
concern was the effect of trees and animals imported from Earth on his tiny 
planet.  He should have added financial institutions.” (manuscript on file with 
the author). 
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The conundrum is notable in the context of the transition 
economies of Eastern and Central Europe:  the co-existence of 
high quality formal legislation, a product of “an external supply 
of legal solutions”26 and low levels of effectiveness.27  Arguably, 
effectiveness of recent reforms in developing and transition 
economies has been inversely related to the degree of conver-
gence to international standards.  Why is this so? 
IV. DYNAMISM AND COMPLEXITY 
In the rush to international standards, a basic lesson from 
comparative legal scholarship has been forgotten:  legal systems 
are both complex and dynamic.28  “Legal systems never are. 
They always become.”29  Legal systems evolve over time by in-
venting, adapting, borrowing, and having change thrust upon 
them.  There are often redundancies, contradictions, and fossil-
ized concepts or practices of no current significance embodied in 
formal legal rules.30  In addition, any one legal concept, in any 
one system, at any one time, exists and operates in a complex 
  
 26. See PISTOR, supra note 3, at 46. 
 27. Id. at 47  
(“Weaknesses in the governance structure that are noted today are 
often attributed to weaknesses in the law, which in turn leads to new 
proposals for improving statutory law.  The evidence of the quality of 
the law on the books, however, suggests that this is at best a partial 
story.  The level of shareholder and creditor rights protection in tran-
sition economies today is higher than in many other countries.  Other 
factors, including the dynamic of the reform process and its impact on 
the development of effective institutions to enforce the new law, need 
to be analyzed more closely in order to understand the remarkable 
difference in the governance of firms despite the trend towards con-
vergence of the law on the books.”). 
 28. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the 
World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997). 
 29. Id. at 14. 
 30. Arguably, cumulative voting, discussed infra, is one of the latter, hav-
ing been displaced, as a practical matter, by statutory provisions permitting 
direct representation on the board through the action of voting groups.  See 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.04 (1979).  For example, chapter 607.0804 of the 
Florida Business Corporations Act (FBCA) reads, “The articles of incorpora-
tion may confer upon holders of any voting group the right to elect one or more 
directors who shall serve for such term and have such voting powers as are 
stated in the articles of incorporation.” FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0804 (1999). 
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relationship with a myriad of other concepts.31  Put simply, “le-
gal systems are the result of a layered complexity that stems 
from the accidents of legal history and from legal transplants.”32 
The complexity and dynamism of legal systems provide yet 
another twist to the convergence/divergence debate.  The forces 
of convergence and divergence operate contemporaneously, but 
selectively, on different kinds of legal rules.  Relatively recent 
statutory law in highly regulated and internationalized areas, 
such as capital markets or banking regulation, may be very 
sensitive to the forces of convergence.  Older, more established 
bodies of law, such as companies or corporate law which have 
their origins in the nineteenth century, are more “path depend-
ent,”33 more resistant to change and to the absorption of “foreign 
elements.”  The more basic the legal concept, the deeper its 
roots and, arguably, the more impervious to external change, to 
the forces of convergence, it becomes.  Concepts of contract, 
status, and property, for example, reach back hundreds and 
thousands of years, and these concepts form the core of corpora-
tions law.34 
  
 31. For example, in the United States, state corporate law contains provi-
sions with respect to the use of proxies in shareholder voting.  For publicly 
traded corporations, however, SEC regulations on proxy voting are much more 
significant and extensive, rendering the state provisions more or less irrele-
vant.  Corporate law itself draws together concepts of status, contract, prop-
erty, agency, trust law, etc.  Directors’ fiduciary duties, that cornerstone of 
Anglo-American corporate governance, have no one single form of expression.  
Fiduciary law concepts were developed by the early English courts of equity 
and still find their fundamental expression through the courts.  In addition, 
various statutory formulations in U.S. corporate law (the familiar duty of care 
and duty of loyalty provisions, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1999)), draw 
on the very different concepts of negligence and trust law.  The courts provide 
further judicial glosses on existing statutory provisions, and in many states, 
later enactments in reaction to judicial decisions, such as Smith v. van 
Gorkom, significantly undercut the coterminous, but earlier, general statutory 
duties.  See generally Smith v. van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  See, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (severely limiting directors’ liability for breaches of 
duty.). 
 32. Mattei, supra note 28, at 13–14. 
 33. See BEBCHUK & ROE, supra note 10, at 154. 
 34. Roman law concepts have persisted over several thousand years, in 
both the common and civil law traditions, the common law having undergone 
a period of “early” reception of Roman law.  “One of the effects of the Norman 
conquest was to throw England into closer intellectual contact with the Conti-
nent….During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the foundations of 
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Further, legal concepts are part of complex systems and oper-
ate interdependently within their system.  Capital market rules 
interact with corporate law rules, which themselves are 
grounded in notions of contract, status and property.  Legal 
rules that, in theory, should be effective at one level, could be 
disabled by conflicts or incompatibility at another level.  The 
grief which followed mass privatizations of the 1990s can be 
attributed to the indiscriminate mixing and matching of legal 
rules, a process of transplantation which resulted in dysfunc-
tional or imbalanced feedback loops.  Corporate governance sys-
tems could not support capital markets and nascent or ailing 
capital markets collapsed or declined.  Without the disciplines 
of the capital markets, corporate governance systems faltered.  
This is not the whole story, of course, but it is a part of it.35 
Adding to the complexity of the operation of “formal” legal 
rules is another complex layer, sometimes referred to as “legal 
sensibilities.”36  Legal sensibilities consist not only of “rules and 
principles which can be cast in propositional form, but also of 
higher order understandings, received techniques, constella-
tions of values and shared ways of perceiving reality, which are 
pervasive, often subtle, and themselves deeply layered in com-
plex and important ways.”37  A keystone to modern corporate 
  
the common law were being laid, Roman law…exercised great influence in 
England….” HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 21, at 504.  Roman “civil law” deals 
primarily with concepts of status, property and contract, the backbone of the 
great nineteenth-century civil codes. 
 35. The “tunneling” and looting of corporate assets in the 1990s that oc-
curred in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the wake of mass privatizations 
have been the subject of a number of studies.  See, e.g., John Nellis, Time to 
Rethink Privatizations, in TRANSITION ECONOMIES FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
16 (1999).  With respect to the Czech Republic, John Nellis writes that “While 
the most visible reasons for inadequate enterprise restructuring are weak-
nesses in capital and financial markets, the voucher privatization method 
itself—with its emphasis on speed, postponement of consideration of many 
aspects of the legal/institutional framework and initial atomization of owner-
ship—is seen as the underlying cause.”  Id. at 17. 
 36. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 288 
(6th ed. 1998) (citing Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Com-
parative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 215 (1983)). 
 37. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 288–89. 
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governance theory, the fiduciary duty, for example, is imbued 
with the legal sensibilities unique to its time and place.38 
V. THE PUBLIC FACE OF LAW 
In the search for answers to the conundrum of corporate gov-
ernance, the focus has been primarily on what this paper calls 
“public legal rules”:  legislation, regulation, and to a much 
lesser degree, efforts of the judiciary.  These rules constitute the 
public face of law.  That much of the legal content of interna-
tional standards has been drawn from statutory law is not sur-
prising as statutory law is the most visible and accessible layer 
of a legal system.  Statutory law, however, may only be the tip 
of the iceberg.  The true significance of statutory law, too, may 
not be what it seems in that its role and importance in positing 
normative principles can vary from system to system.39 
Drawing indicia of investor protection and good corporate 
governance from national corporate statutes, the easiest and 
most obvious sources, may also be highly misleading, depending 
on the role of statutory law in a system (peripheral, supplemen-
tal, fundamental).  An aging body of statutory law may also be 
deceptive; legal systems are dynamic and statutory law inflexi-
ble, ossifying over time with concepts that no long function as 
they once did.40  Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms 
may not be in the “corporate law” at all; they may be found in a 
civil code41 or even a constitution.42  Nonetheless, much of the 
debate surrounding corporate governance and the operation of 
capital markets has revolved around “public legal rules,” i.e. 
legislation and, to a much lesser extent, judicial pronounce-
  
 38. These “interaction effects impede putting our finger on one or two key 
features as indicative of whether technical corporate law is overall good or 
bad.”  MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 32 (Colum. Law School, Ctr. for 
Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 186, Jan. 16, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=260582 (last visited May 
20, 2005). 
 39. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003). 
 40. See discussion of cumulative voting, infra Section VI(g). 
 41. For example, civil codes will often contain a title on legal persons in the 
first book on persons.  See infra text accompanying note 144 discussing cumu-
lative voting and the Illinois constitution. 
 42. Id. 
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ments.43  Often, where a transplanted legal rule has been disap-
pointingly ineffective, greater judicial action, or enforcement, 
has been called for.44 
Unfortunately, this futile seesawing between demands for 
better legislation and greater judicial enforcement ignores the 
inherent complexity and dynamism of legal systems.  As norma-
tive forces, even indigenous legislation and judicial enforcement 
demonstrate different levels of effectiveness depending on the 
particular legal system in which they are operating.  Add 
transplanted legal concepts to the equation, and the possible 
outcomes become much more uncertain. 
VI. PRIVATE LEGAL RULES AND LEGAL SENSIBILITIES 
The debate over the role of legal rules in capital market de-
velopment and corporate governance systems has focused on 
the public face of law, ex ante legislation and its ex post en-
forcement through the judicial process.  Largely overlooked in 
this debate, however, has been the role of private legal rules (ex 
ante and ex post) and legal sensibilities.  Private legal rules are 
established by contract (ex ante) and implemented and enforced 
(ex post) by means of various dispute resolution mechanisms, 
including arbitration, market discipline, “reputational hostage-
taking,”45 and other subtle, situational factors.  Professor Frank 
  
 43. It is no coincidence that reliance on legislation and the judiciary are 
hallmarks of the U.S. legal system, in particular. See infra Section VI(g). 
 44. The following statement, with respect to Korean derivative law suits 
(an ill-advised transplant for a number of legal and cultural reasons) is typi-
cal: “The small number of derivative lawsuits brought by minority sharehold-
ers in Korea reflects the shortcomings in enforcement practices.  Between 
1998 and 2002 a total of 13 suits were filed by minority shareholders.”  Insti-
tute of International Finance, Inc., IIF Equity Advisory Group, Corporate 
Governance in Korea An Investor Perspective Task Force Report, July 2003, at 
4, available at http://www.iif.com/data/public/KoreaTaskForceReport_Final. 
pdf (last visited May 20, 2005).  
 45. As an example of the interplay of public and private rules, Professor 
Frank Partnoy of the University of San Diego recently presented a paper at 
the Brookings Institution looking at the regulation of the derivatives markets 
in the United States from this perspective.  See Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, 
CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation?, in 
BROOKINGS-WHARTON: PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 2–3 (Robert E. Litan & 
Richard Herring eds., 2002).  The derivatives markets in the United States 
are regulated by a combination of private and public legal rules which operate 
ex ante and ex post, and are presented schematically in Diagram A:  
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Partnoy looked at the operation of ex ante and ex post public 
and private rules recently in the context of the U.S. derivatives 
markets and concluded that the “recent trend to privatize legal 
rules applicable to derivatives is likely to continue.”46 
The characterization of legal rules as public or private, how-
ever, does not capture the dynamism and complexity of legal 
rules.  Private and public legal rules interact, but also ebb and 
flow over time.  Rather than Partnoy’s static four-cornered box, 
it is more useful to consider a continuum or spectrum along 
  
Diagram A: Derivatives Regulation Framework 
 
 Private Public 
Ex Ante Contract 
 
(ISDA) 
Congress 
 
(CFMA) 
Ex Post Arbitration 
 
(NASD) 
Courts 
 
(SDNY) 
 
 46. Id. at 36. 
First are private ex ante legal rules developed primarily by the Inter-
national Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) for OTC de-
rivatives (and by various exchanges and self-regulatory organizations 
for exchange-traded derivatives).  The recent trend has been toward 
increased privatization of derivatives regulation, with trading vol-
umes shifting from exchanges to OTC transactions, and this trend is 
likely to continue…Second are private ex post legal rules applied by 
arbitrators in disputes, particularly those of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD)…Arbitration has numerous drawbacks, 
especially uncertainty, and likely will not predominate in future ad-
judication of derivates disputes….Third are public ex ante legal rules, 
including securities, commodities, and banking law and regulation, 
but also including derivatives-specific rules.  Historically, public 
regulation in these areas has not achieved its goals; instead public le-
gal rules too often have generated perverse incentives related to regu-
latory arbitrage, regulatory licenses, and regulatory competi-
tion….Fourth are public ex post legal rules, including rulings by 
courts adjudicating derivatives disputes.  Thus far, judges have shied 
from deciding important issues in derivatives disputes, and end-users 
of derivatives increasingly avoid litigation—even when losses are 
large—because of the high costs of discovery and motion practice.  
Id. at 2–3. 
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which normative forces move and manifest themselves in dif-
ferent forms, sometimes at different times, sometimes contem-
poraneously.  Along the continuum, in order of informality, are 
legal sensibilities at one end, moving through standards of be-
havior or conduct, private legal rules, various intermediate or 
hybrid forms of public/private rules,47 through to formal legisla-
tion and judicial action on the other end.  A variation on Part-
noy’s square would be: 
 
Corporate Governance Rules 
A Continuum 
 
 Legal 
Sensibili-
ties 
Standards 
of 
Behavior 
Private 
Rules 
Quasi- 
Prvate/ 
Public 
Rules 
Public 
Rules 
Ex 
Ante 
C moral 
obligation 
C voluntary 
codes 
C contract C stock ex-
change 
listing rules 
Clegislation 
Ex 
Post 
C  moral 
opprobrium 
C reputa-
tional 
conse-
quences 
Carbitration Cspecialized 
arbitration 
Cjudicial 
action 
 
   Less formal=-----------------------------------------------------------------<More formal 
 
In emerging, transitional, and developing economies, the cor-
porate governance debate has spawned a more varied range of 
responses than may at first be apparent.  International stan-
dards are not necessarily producing cookie-cutter reforms oper-
ating across the board in a synchronized and predictable fash-
ion.  Credit this to the ingenuity of legal practitioners of all ilks, 
especially in Latin America, and the inexorable process of indi-
genization of legal transplants.48 
  
 47. Intermediate or hybrid forms of rules are the product of the interaction 
of various kinds of normative forces.  
 48. For a more detailed discussion of the Latin American initiatives, see 
Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective Are Capital Markets in Exerting 
Governance on Corporations?, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES 
OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 327 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2002).  
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A. Private Legal Rules: Powerful and Pervasive 
Private legal rules are powerful and pervasive.  Contract is at 
the heart of any market and capital markets are no exception.  
From the central contract of purchase and sale radiates an ex-
tensive network of complex contractual relations which make 
the market function.  The Euromarket (originally the Eurobond 
market) is a highly successful capital market, which until re-
cently has been governed virtually exclusively by various forms 
of private legal rules.49  It has proven remarkably resistant to 
the intrusion of legislation, although it may finally have been 
caught in the regulatory net of the European Union.50 
  
On the process of indigenization of legal transplants, see Legrand, supra note 
20, at 111. 
 49. See Frank Graaf, Euromarket Finance: Issues of Euromarket Securities 
and Syndicated Eurocurrency Loans, in EUROMARKET FINANCE 13–14 (1991). 
 50. One controversial aspect of the recently enacted EU Prospectus Direc-
tive is that it will impose greater restraints on issuances of securities in the 
Euromarket, which has traditionally been viewed as a “professionals only” 
market.  See Council Directive 2003/71/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_345/l_34520031231en00640089.pdf.  “Euro-securities” 
have benefited from significant exemptions from regulation.  The definition of 
“euro-securities” appeared in the 1989 EU Prospectus Directive: 
‘Euro-securities’ shall mean transferable securities which:  
– are to be underwritten and distributed by a syndicate, at least 
two of the members of which have their registered offices in dif-
ferent States, and 
– are offered on a significant scale in one or more States other 
than that of the issuer’s registered office, and  
– may be subscribed for or initially acquired only through a credit 
institution or other financial institution. 
Council Directive 89/298/EEC, art. 3(f), 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8–15, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:319 
89L0298:EN:HTML.  The definition carried over in 1993 to the EU Invest-
ment Services Directive.  Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27–
46, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do 
?uri=CELEX:31993L0022:EN:HTML (now repealed by Council Directive 
2004/39/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 126) 1). 
As explained in GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW: 
All one need add is that the value of the business conducted on the 
[Euromarket] is enormous (far greater than that on any stock ex-
change); that when trading starts it will normally be in lots exceeding 
$(US) 25,000; and that there are efficiently organized clearing sys-
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At their origin, stock exchange listing rules, for example, are 
private legal rules, adhered to by contractual arrangement.  
This, in fact, is often the main source of their weakness as a 
regulatory mechanism in case of market abuse; relying on con-
tract, exchanges ordinarily may go no further than delisting 
(resiliation of the contract to list) or resort to public censure (i.e. 
  
tems….[T]he attitude of the United Kingdom (and of other countries) 
has been studiously to exclude [euro-securities] from regulation—an 
attitude acquiesced in by the European Commission.  The arguments 
of the [Association of International Bond Dealers] and its members 
which have led to this ‘hands-off’ treatment are (i) that the market is 
used by ‘professionals only’ and (ii) that if attempts were made to 
regulate it more strictly the centre of its operations would move from 
London to somewhere else in the European time zone (say Zurich 
[Switzerland is not a member of the EU]), thus depriving the United 
Kingdom (and, perhaps, the Community) of one of its more valuable 
financial assets. 
GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 402 (6th ed. 1997).  The Euro-
market or, as Hal Scott calls it, the “international unregulated private place-
ment market,” has “adopted what market participants call ‘international’ 
documentation or rules, developed by issuers, underwriters, and institutional 
investors.”  Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities 
Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73 (2000) (emphasis added).  Even in 
the face of greater regulation to be imposed by the 2003 EU Prospectus Direc-
tive, the market is responding in an attempt to preserve enclaves free from 
regulation: 
From 1 July 05 the EU introduces a new regime which will make the 
disclosure and continuing obligations even for “professionals only” of-
ferings, more onerous.  In justifiable fear of a flight of business (I 
have been advising the Swiss Stock Exchange on the implementation 
of its new Eurobond listing regime) both London and [Luxembourg] 
are planning to establish new ‘unregulated’ listing regimes outside 
the scope of the new EU regulated regime.  Interesting times in the 
Eurobond market! 
Correspondence with Nick Eastwell, Partner, Linklaters (Feb. 21, 2005) (on 
file with author).  Other “unregulated” markets are seeking to capitalize on 
the greater regulation of the traditional Euro-market.  “Switzerland is also 
proposing to continue the old EU Eurobond regime by permitting listings in 
currencies other than Swiss Francs.  The Channel Islands are proposing a 
similar market as is Singapore….All in all, it is not clear which debt market 
non-EU issuers will choose.”  Correspondence with Peter Noble, member of 
the International Primary Market Association (IPMA) Working Group dealing 
with the EU Prospectus Directive and Partner, Ogilvy Renault (Feb. 21, 
2005). 
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invoke the power of legal sensibilities).51  Over time, listing 
rules have been transformed in many cases by an overlay of 
public legal rules, so called “statutory backing” or subjugation 
to supervisory oversight, thus evolving into a form of semi- or 
quasi- public legal rule. 
Contract, too, is at the heart of the corporate entity.  Modern 
U.S. legal theory looks at the corporation as a “nexus of con-
tracts.”52  In the interest of efficiency, corporate law (public legal 
rules) acts primarily to establish a standard form of “contract,” 
or default rules, for the internal organization of corporations.53  
The incorporators themselves, and subsequent shareholders, 
may vary these rules (and often do) virtually in their entirety by 
contract in the private or close corporation.  Close corporations, 
private companies, are the predominant corporate form 
throughout the world, in some cases comprising 99% of incorpo-
  
 51. See also Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48 (discussing mandatory 
arbitration of shareholder disputes required of companies listing on Level 2 of 
the Novo Mercado, the Sao Paulo Exchange’s recently created “corporate 
governance board”). 
 52.  
Law and economic theorists conceptualize the corporation in terms of 
contract law.  A corporation can be viewed as a nexus of contracts 
through which various claimants such as creditors, workers, share-
holders, and consumers enter into agreements.  Private contracts are 
an efficient means to lower transaction costs in the agency relation-
ship between the shareholders and managers.  One can view the arti-
cles of incorporation and the bylaws as a contract between the share-
holders and the managers setting out the rules governing their rela-
tionship.  This private ordering through contracts allows the parties 
to provide rules to maximize value and minimize costs.  Under this 
view, corporate law should provide the basic terms of these contracts 
(that is, default rules), but the shareholders and the managers should 
be allowed to change the terms, thus providing an optimal and mutu-
ally agreeable system. 
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 
115–16 (1999). 
 53. In the United Kingdom, and many other Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
contract is still the basis of the formation of a company; the memorandum of 
association, the contract among the founding members, is registered in order 
to benefit from limited liability and legal personality.  The contractual basis of 
the company had long been a theoretical impediment to the creation of one 
shareholder companies; it takes two to tango and two (at least in the common 
law, if not in the civil law) to contract.  See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6 (1914). 
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rations or registrations.54  They are primarily creatures of con-
tract and rely on contract, in the form of by-laws and share-
holder agreements in particular, for their operation. 
The primacy of contract in the market also underpins the 
dominant regulatory approach to the capital markets (and, sec-
ondarily, corporate governance), which is the U.S. disclosure-
based regime.  The nature of these public, disclosure-based 
rules is determined by their deference to the private legal rules 
of the market:  essentially, buyer beware.  What are the charac-
teristics of contract?  It is consensual, flexible, and, optimally, 
both self-enforcing and independent of political process.  Private 
legal rules can, thus, circumvent the impediments to financial 
market development thrown up by the “political structure 
within a country.”55 
Each characteristic of contract can vary in degree, but its 
consensual nature is arguably its defining characteristic.  Stan-
dard form contracts, rife in the securities industry, are largely 
inflexible, either for the sake of predictability and convenience 
or due to the superior bargaining power of industry partici-
pants, but they are still consensual.  By-laws or industry asso-
ciation rules are a variation on standard form contracts.56  In 
becoming a member of the organization or company, the mem-
ber agrees to abide by the rules.  Contract thus forms the basis 
of so-called self-regulatory organizations prevalent in the Anglo-
American securities industry. 
  
 54. For example, at the time of the author’s work on proposals for modern-
ized companies legislation in Hong Kong, nearly 99% of companies registered 
in Hong Kong were private companies.  “Of the 483,181 companies registered 
in Hong Kong as of 31 December 1997, 477,140 are private companies.”  
CALLY JORDAN, REVIEW OF THE HONG KONG COMPANIES ORDINANCE – 
CONSULTANCY REPORT 30 (1997).  For information on the German equivalent 
of the close corporation or private company, see also SCHLESINGER ET AL., su-
pra note 36, at 923 (“In Germany and in most countries that have followed its 
model, the limited liability company (GmbH) is enormously popular.  By 1991, 
Germany had about 465,660 limited liability companies (GmbHs) as opposed 
to only 2,800 stock corporations (AGs)….”). 
 55. See generally RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 8.  
 56. The derivation of the word “by-law” is interesting in this respect.  It is 
believed to come from the Old Norse language “byrlaw”: a local custom or law 
of a manor or district whereby disputes over boundaries and trespass were 
settled without recourse to the public courts of law or a regulation or ordinance 
agreed to by consent in baronial court.  NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 310–11 (2d ed. 1993). 
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There are, however, several drawbacks to private legal rules.  
In the absence of agreement, there is impasse.  Then there must 
be recourse to public law, which is rigid, prescriptive, circum-
scribed, and, in the case of legislation, at least, subject to the 
vagaries of political process.57  Nevertheless, in certain circum-
stances and certain legal systems, public legal rules are more 
effective than private legal rules. 
B. Private Legal Rules are Important 
The debate over regulation of capital markets and governance 
of corporations since the early 1990s has primarily been an An-
glo-American one.58  Not surprisingly, many governance mecha-
nisms that have recently proliferated find their origins in An-
glo-American law and practice.59  Although the debate surged 
into public prominence ten to fifteen years ago (for a variety of 
reasons),60 it has been the daily bread of lawyers and account-
ants for a hundred and fifty years or more. 
Over time, fairly standardized private legal rules developed 
in the context of negotiated partnership contracts, shareholder 
agreements, and private company by-laws.  These private legal 
  
 57. The judiciary and judicial action may not be immune to the vagaries of 
political process either.  Despite the admirable independence of the U.S. judi-
ciary, the appointment process is highly politicized. 
 58. The debate has, in more recent years, been picked up with vigor in Asia 
and continental Europe, where the issues and concepts are being recast in a 
different corporate and legal context.  See, for example, the efforts of the 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), at http://www.ecgi.org, and 
the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), at http://www.acga-
asia.org. 
 59. For example, voluntary codes, cumulative voting and class actions.  See 
discussion infra Sections VI(e), (f), (g). 
 60. Some of the reasons include U.K. privatizations of the 1980s creating a 
vocal shareholder base wielding political power, the tabloid scandals of the 
Maxwell affair, outrageous U.S. executive compensation, the glamorization of 
Wall Street, etc.  The London Stock Exchange and the UK Society of Account-
ants worked together to look at the issues, primarily involving financial ac-
countability of the board of directors.  Their report, the “Cadbury Report,” 
proved extraordinarily influential in shaping the ensuing world-wide corpo-
rate governance debates.  See Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corpo-
rate Governance, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corpo-
rate Governance (1992), available at http://www.blindtiger.co.uk/IIA/uploads 
/2c9103-ea9f7e9fbe--7e3a/Cadbury.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) [hereinafter 
Cadbury Report]. 
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rules were designed to balance the ongoing economic interests 
of participants and, if necessary, provide egress from the enter-
prise and dispute resolution without recourse to the courts.  In 
commercial matters, the courts would be a last resort.61 
In the United States, possibly for reasons discussed below, 
some of these contractual governance mechanisms metamor-
phosed into various kinds of public legal rules, particularly in 
the case of private or close corporations.  Among these rules 
were tag-along rights in case of change of control, puts and calls 
to provide an exit, valuation mechanisms to determine economic 
interests, disinterested voting techniques to deal with conflicts 
of interest, buy-out or appraisal mechanisms triggered by cer-
tain events, and arbitration and non-judicial dispute resolu-
tion.62  Some of these contractual governance mechanisms were 
adapted and crossed over to the realm of public corporations.  
Their outlines, for example, are readily discernible in the Wil-
liams Act,63 which is the source of U.S. tender offer rules. 
These contractual governance mechanisms are not exclusive 
to the United States.  For example, these private legal rules 
figure prominently, in different forms, in recent Latin American 
initiatives, such as the so-called corporate governance board of 
the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange.64  Private legal rules, contract, 
are important in and of themselves but are also important in 
two other respects.  First, private legal rules generate market-
tested solutions that can, over time, provide the basis for public 
legal rules of greater general applicability, as has been the ex-
perience in the United States.  Secondly, as Professor Partnoy 
observes, over time, public legal rules may migrate back to the 
private sector in search of a more effective form of expression. 
  
 61. Litigation can be a devastatingly slow and expensive process that can 
destroy a business or commercial relationship. 
 62. These mechanisms, for the most part, are now statutory in nature in 
state corporate law following the MBCA.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 
214 (cumulative voting), 262 (appraisal rights) (2001).  
 63. Williams Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)–(f) (2000). 
 64. For a detailed discussion, see Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48. 
File: Jordan.MACRO.06.16.05.doc Created on: 6/16/2005 3:26 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:35 PM 
2005] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1005 
C. Legal Traditions:  Different Balances in Terms of the  
Effectiveness of Private and Public Legal Rules 
Even within the common law tradition, there are significant 
differences between English (now Commonwealth) and U.S. 
traditions.  The U.S. common law tradition branched off over 
two hundred years ago at the time of the American Revolution65 
and, in some interesting respects, has greater affinities with the 
continental European tradition than with the English common 
law:  “Law in the United States is generally seen as adhering to 
a common law ‘family,’ but today this is far from obvious.”66  
This fundamental misunderstanding of the U.S. legal system 
has distorted an otherwise thought-provoking analysis of the 
relationship of legal origins and development of financial sys-
tems.67  “The particular genius of US law…has been its con-
structive combination of elements of both civil and common 
law.”68 
The U.S. and English traditions do share a common charac-
teristic, although it may find a different manner of expression 
in each system:  heavy reliance on ex post public legal rules 
through enforcement in the courts.  As every common law stu-
dent learns in the first week of law school, there is no right 
without a [judicial] remedy.69  This remedial legacy endows pro-
  
 65. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2–5 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. ed., 1996). 
 66. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 248, 251 (2d ed. 
2004). 
In many respects US law represents a deliberate rejection of common 
law principles, with preference being given to more affirmative ideas 
clearly derived from civil law.  These were not somehow reinvented in 
the United States but taken over directly from civilian sources in a 
massive process of change in adherence to legal information in the 
nineteenth century. 
Id. at 248. 
 67. See supra note 2. 
 68. GLENN, supra note 66, at 251 (emphasis added) (“Grant Gilmore ob-
served that U.S. lawyers were ‘convinced eighteenth-century rationalists,’ in 
the French tradition, while at the same time, U.S. law would represent ‘the 
arrogation of unlimited power by the judges.’”). 
 69. Id. at 228  
(“‘Where there is no remedy there is no wrong [quoting Maitland].’  
So the common law came to be composed of a series of procedural 
routes (usually referred to as remedies) to get before a jury and state 
one’s case….In contemporary language the common law was there-
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cedural elements of the law and the judicial system in common 
law traditions with great importance.  This centrality of proce-
dural law and the judicial system is not necessarily recognized 
or shared in other legal traditions.70 
In the English common law, the importance of judicial action, 
case law, and ex post public legal rules continue to dominate 
statutory, or written, law, the ex ante public legal rules.  The 
English common law system demonstrates to this day a surpris-
ing aversion to law as legislation, to ex ante public legal rules.71  
  
fore a law of procedure; whatever substantive law existed was hidden 
by it, ‘secreted’ in its ‘interstices,’ in the language of Maine.”). 
 70. Id. (“The procedure was, and is, unique in the world and may be today 
the most distinctive feature of the common law.”). 
 71. In the company law area, for example, both the U.K. and Hong Kong 
(while still British territory) demonstrated an active resistance to creating 
statutory formulations of directors’ duties and the derivative action, prefer-
ring to rely on a tangled mass of case law dating back to the 1840s.  See 
JORDAN supra note 54, at 122  
(“Until recently, it seemed that the United Kingdom was moving in 
the direction of statutory standards [of directors’ duties].  According 
to the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry working group on Di-
rectors Duties, there was ‘support emerging for the codification of di-
rectors’ duties similar to the approach adopted in other Common-
wealth countries.  The DTI favours a reduced Part X coupled with a 
‘statement’ of directors’ duties’ (Great Britain, Department of Trade 
and Industry, DTI’s Programme for the Reform of Company Law –
Progress Report (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 11 June 
1996)).  A subsequent Progress Report (October 1996) indicates, how-
ever, that such an initiative has been again derailed.  The U.K. Jen-
kins Committee, in 1962, considered that a general statement of the 
basic principles underlying the fiduciary relationship of directors to-
wards their companies would be useful to directors and others con-
cerned with company management.  The Second Report in Hong 
Kong in 1973 agreed and so recommended.  The SCCLR has also so 
recommended.  Efforts were made to develop a statutory formulation 
of directors’ fiduciary duties in Hong Kong, the most recent being the 
Companies (Amendment) Bill 1991.  The Bill was not enacted due to 
objections expressed in particular by the Law Society.  The Law Soci-
ety was of the view (among other things) that any attempt to draft a 
statutory formulation of directors’ fiduciary duties would be incom-
plete and that it was better to continue with the present system 
where a director should consult his professional advisors whenever a 
question involving his fiduciary duties to the company arose.  When 
the Bill was withdrawn, the Government encouraged the private sec-
tor to draft guidelines to better inform directors of their duties.  In 
1995 the Hong Kong branch of the Institute of Directors published 
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Large and complex swathes of English law are not found in 
written legislation.  Trust law, from which is derived the con-
cept of “fiduciary duties” so important to corporate governance 
in the Anglo-American system, is a prime example; its funda-
mental principles remain judge-made, with ex post public legal 
rules as their source.  
In some instances, there are not even judge-made rules to 
look to in England.  For example, England has no written con-
stitution; rather, in its place are “parliamentary conventions” 
which developed over long periods of time and operate on a con-
sensual basis.72  These parliamentary conventions are imbued 
with “legal sensibilities,” but not less effective for that reason.  
Fiduciary duty, too, draws much of its residual power from the 
influences of legal sensibilities, leftovers from an earlier time 
when they enjoyed greater formal normative force.73  The con-
  
Guidelines for Directors which was, in part, intended to be responsive 
to the need for some private sector guidelines.  Of special interest in 
this area is the SEHK Listing Rules’ formulation of directors’ duties, 
which demonstrates its affinity to modern statutory formulations.”).   
A form of statutory derivative action was also resisted in Hong Kong (al-
though there were other considerations at work as well).  In recommending 
the creation of such a statutory provision, the Consultancy Report stated that  
On balance, in the interests of certainty, simplicity and conformity 
with other Commonwealth jurisdictions, a statutory derivative action 
is desirable.  The prophylactic effect of such an action is salutary.  It 
also appears to be the only way in which to lay to rest the unruly 
ghost of Foss v. Harbottle [1843], which it  must be remembered, was 
decided before the advent of even 19th century statutory company law.  
The U.K. case law on the rule in Foss v. Harbottle has taken some 
unfortunate turns in recent years creating unnecessary hurdles for 
shareholders in international disputes being played out in the United 
Kingdom.   Characterised as a procedural rule under principles of 
U.K. private international law, the intricacies of the  rule have been 
superimposed on shareholders of companies incorporated in other ju-
risdictions which provide more modern remedies.  There is some evi-
dence that this line of U.K. case law would also be applied in Hong 
Kong. 
Id. at 152. 
 72. What a way to run a country some might say.  For a discussion of par-
liamentary conventions, see Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 
S.C.R. 753 (Can.) at 772. 
 73. The fiduciary duty has its origins in medieval ecclesiastic courts in 
England; at the time, canon, or ecclesiastical, law and the ecclesiastic courts 
were a very real and present source of normative propositions.  See Mary Szto, 
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cept of fiduciary duty, so fundamental to Anglo-American corpo-
rate governance, does not transplant well, if at all, because of 
its dependence on specific court structures and cultural and his-
toric “legal sensibilities.”74 
The U.S. legal tradition shows no such reticence in the use of 
legislation, ex ante public legal rules.  In this respect, proclivi-
ties of the U.S. legal tradition are more in line with those of 
continental Europe.75  It is no accident that the United States 
has a Uniform Commercial Code,76 Bankruptcy Code, and any 
number of other state and federal codes.77  The formative dec-
ades of the early Republic were very much influenced by French 
legal thought and institutions.78  
As for continental European legal traditions, which serve as 
the basis for the legal systems of much of the world outside the 
  
Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 
23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 61 (2004).    
 74. The Chinese Companies Law of 1993 crudely ‘codified’ certain aspects 
of the fiduciary duty: managers are prohibited from accepting bribes and from 
depositing company funds in their personal bank accounts, for example. See 
Company Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 211, 214 (Adopted at 
the Fifth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's 
Congress, 1993), available at http://www.cclaw.net/download/companylaw.asp 
(last visited May 20, 2005).  See also id. art. 59, para. 2 (“A directors [sic], 
supervisor, or the general manager may not abuse their authorities by accept-
ing bribes or generating other illegal income, and may not convert company 
property.”); art. 60, para. 2.  (“A director or the general manager may not de-
posit company assets into an account in his own name or in any other individ-
ual's name.”); art. 61 (“A director or the general manager may not engage in 
the same business as the company in which he serves as a director or the gen-
eral manager either for his own account or for any other person's account, or 
engage in any activity detrimental to company interests.  If a director or the 
general manager engages in any of the above mentioned business or activity, 
any income so derived shall be turned over to the company.”).  Note that the 
latter part of art. 61 is a classic statement of the fiduciary law remedy for 
breach of the prohibition on acting in a conflict of interest.  
 75. See generally GLENN, supra note 66 (discussing global legal traditions). 
 76. It is a sometimes overlooked fact that the Uniform Commercial Code in 
the United States was inspired directly by the German Commercial Code.  
“The principal architect of the Code, the late Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, had 
spent considerable time in Germany, and there can be no doubt that some of 
the Code’s important features were inspired by his study of German law.”  
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 20–21. 
 77. For more on the history of the Bankruptcy Code, see DAVID A. SKEEL, 
DEBT’S DOMINION:  A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001).   
 78. See generally GLENN, supra note 66. 
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Commonwealth, their most important defining characteristic 
may be the importance of “written law,” ex ante public legal 
rules, particularly as embodied in the great nineteenth-century 
civil and commercial codes.  These countries are pays du droit 
ecrit, which translates as “countries of written law.”79  If in the 
common law world there is no right (or, more correctly, no 
wrong) without a remedy, then in the continental European 
tradition there is no right without a written law.  In the conti-
nental European context, judicial pronouncements are of rela-
tively (and the stress here is on relatively) little importance.80 
A related characteristic of continental European law, virtu-
ally unknown in the United Kingdom, is the hierarchy of laws: 
in decreasing order, constitution, code, statute, decree, and 
regulation.  As in a game of cards, a civil or commercial code 
provision will always trump a statutory law, which is consid-
ered “specialized” or subordinate legislation, subject to the 
overarching principles of the code.  Any subsequent legal trans-
plant which takes the form of statutory enactment will be sub-
servient to even pre-existing civil code provisions which may 
date back a century or more. 
  
 79. “Pays du droit ecrit” being a term identifying a certain geographic area 
(originally, that region of France south of the Loire) and a legal tradition (de-
riving from a continuation of Roman law somewhat modified by Germanic 
custom). 
At the time of the withdrawal of the Romans [from the south of what 
is now modern France], Roman provincials (who in accordance with 
the personality principle were governed by Roman law) by far out-
numbered Germanic settlers.  The result was that Roman 
law…continued to be the law of the land, modified to some extent by 
Germanic custom.   
HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 21, at 509.    
 80. As with all such generalizations, the interest lies in the exceptions.  
However, see GLENN, supra note 66, at 145–46 
(“There are problems…with the notion of judicial independence in the 
civilian tradition.  Given the ancien régime, nobody wants a ‘gou-
vernement des juges’, so the primacy of the codes, and legislation in 
general, is reinforced by ongoing skepticism towards, and even sur-
veillance of (through control of the career structure) the civilian judi-
ciary.”). 
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D. Effective Rules:  Form and Substance 
The preceding discussion has not been idle dalliance in the 
fascinating, but irrelevant, backwaters of comparative law.  The 
effectiveness of a governance mechanism in a particular legal 
system will relate to the form it takes.  To the extent that the 
LLSV literature recognized that legal families do matter, it pro-
vided a valuable insight.81  Pistor, too, is correct in her observa-
tion that the manner in which a legal concept is introduced or 
transplanted matters.82 Equally, the form which a rule takes 
matters.83  Some of the otherwise “inexplicable” consequences, 
such as the failures of the waves of capital markets and corpo-
rate governance initiatives, can be traced to a failure to recog-
nize the importance of these observations. 
Some of the most popular governance mechanisms, such as 
voluntary codes, cumulative voting and class actions, may not 
survive transplantation to another legal system because they 
are an inappropriate form of rule.  Others may be fundamen-
tally incompatible with the underlying legal structure.  The 
concept of fiduciary duty, for example, is notable for its absence 
in other legal systems despite its importance as a mechanism 
for corporate governance in the Anglo-American tradition.  Fi-
duciary duty is a concept too complex, exotic, and imbued with 
legal sensibilities to take root easily elsewhere.84 
E. Voluntary Codes of Corporate Governance 
Voluntary codes of corporate governance have probably been 
the most popular governance mechanism of the 1990s and have 
proliferated, irrespective of legal tradition, corporate ownership 
patterns or level of development of the capital market.  These 
codes trace their immediate origins to the 1992 Cadbury Report 
in the United Kingdom.85  None would question the extraordi-
  
 81. As noted above, the LLSV “legal origins” literature fundamentally mis-
understood the nature of these legal families. 
 82. See BERKOWITZ ET AL., supra note 9. 
 83. See Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48. 
 84. Again, the exceptions to this generalization are of interest.  See supra 
note 74 and accompanying text for the examples of codification of fiduciary 
duties in Chinese companies law and the discussion infra note 94 and accom-
panying text of the introduction of trust law principles in the Quebec and 
Mexican civil codes. 
 85. See Cadbury Report, supra note 60. 
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nary influence of the Cadbury Report in spawning a world-wide 
interest in corporate governance and the mechanisms to pro-
mote it.  In the United Kingdom, its country of origin, the cur-
rent manifestation of the Cadbury Report and its subsequent 
recommendations is the Combined Code.”86  The most signifi-
cant feature of the Combined Code is that, contrary to the im-
plication in its title, it is not written law but, rather, is a “volun-
tary” code.  In the continental European tradition, a “voluntary” 
code is an oxymoron.  A “code,” in the European tradition, is 
written law of high normative force.87 
So, what is the Combined Code, if not legislation?  It is a code 
in another sense in that it is “a set of rules on any subject, esp., 
the prevalent morality of a society or class; an individual’s 
standard of moral behaviour.”88  The Combined Code is a code of 
conduct and ethics informed by legal sensibilities.  The Com-
bined Code is not even a form of private legal rule; rather, it is 
no more than a set of suggested guidelines.  Absent is the bind-
ing force of contract that a set of industry association rules 
might possess by virtue of contractual membership obligations. 
The questions then become, first, how effective the Combined 
Code can be and, second, why this choice of form is appropriate?  
To begin, the Combined Code can be reasonably effective in the 
United Kingdom, all other things being equal.89  Remember that 
the United Kingdom relies on unwritten parliamentary conven-
tions in lieu of a written constitution and has a respectable, if 
now frayed, tradition of the use of moral suasion as a regulatory 
technique.90  The Combined Code is not the only instance of a 
“voluntary” code either in the United Kingdom; the “City Code” 
  
 86. Committee on Corporate Governance, Combined Code, Principles of 
Good Governance and Code of Best Practice (1998) (Eng.), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode3.pdf#search='Committee%20on%
20Corporate%20Governance,%20â€€ œThe%20Combined%20Codeâ€€ %20Lond
on,%201998' (last visited May 20, 2005).  
 87. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines “code” as: “A written 
body of laws so arranged as to avoid inconsistency and overlap.” SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 441 (5th ed. 2002).  
 88. Id. 
 89. There have been criticisms of its effectiveness, but all things are rela-
tive.  
 90. Tea with the Governor of the Bank of England, for example, prior to 
recent regulatory reforms. 
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or Takeover Code91 was not written legislation, it too was a “vol-
untary” code.  The legal sensibilities in this particular area 
have been vital enough in the United Kingdom, at least until 
the very recent past,92 to support the effectiveness of voluntary 
codes as a normative proposition. 
As to the second question concerning choice of form, the an-
swer is more elusive.  It is not as though the United Kingdom 
emulates existing models when embracing a voluntary code.  
Several of the substantive recommendations of the Cadbury 
Report, such as the use of audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees are taken directly from the listing rules of the New 
York Stock Exchange.93  These rules we would characterize as 
semi- or quasi- public rules because their binding nature de-
rives from contract but they are also subject to regulatory over-
sight of Securities and Exchange Commission, a public agency.  
The use of audit committees by New York Stock Exchange-
listed companies was not a pious wish; it was a mandatory re-
quirement.  To trace the origins of the audit committee recom-
mendation even a little further back, it is found in legislative 
  
 91. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
and the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares (2002) (Eng.), 
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).  
 92. The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) was created under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.) and assumed its powers 
and responsibilities on December 1, 2001.  It is an independent non-
governmental regulator, created by statute and exercising statutory powers.  
The FSA is a “unitary” regulator, directly responsible for banking, insurance 
and the investment business.  In its own words, the “FSA takes a radically 
different approach to regulation from that of its predecessors.”  FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AUTHORITY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 
7 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsa_intro.pdf (last vis-
ited May 20, 2005).  The internationalization of capital markets and the con-
sequent pressures exerted from both sides of the Atlantic are likely a prime 
contributor to the decision by the UK authorities to radically change their 
approach to financial services regulation. 
 93. For example, the “audit committee” was introduced by the NYSE in 
1978.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Con-
trols to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, and Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 336 (2004).  
For a description of the audit committee’s duties, see Constitution of the New 
York Stock Exchange, art. IV, § 12(3), available at http://rules.nyse.com/ 
nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_1_4&manual=/nyse/ 
constitution/constitution/. 
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form, as an ex ante public legal rule, even earlier.94 So, there is 
one rule with three different, related, manifestations, which 
begs the question of their relative effectiveness. 
The question remains, however, of the efficacy and wisdom of 
a voluntary code.  A number of virtues can be cited, among 
them flexibility, responsiveness, sensitivity to industry specific 
concerns and considerations, the usual virtues of private legal 
rules.  Underlying these rationales, though, the peculiar British 
aversion to written legislation, ex ante public legal rules, also 
shines through.  There may also be even subtler forces at work 
in influencing the form these rules have taken in the United 
Kingdom. 
For example, the Cadbury Report in 1992 focused on the 
board of directors, its composition and responsibilities.95  The 
directors of English companies, like their U.S. counterparts, are 
subject to fiduciary duties derived from very medieval concepts 
of trust law.  Early nineteenth-century English (and U.S.)96 
business enterprises were often organized as trust vehicles with 
the director roles being assumed by “real” trustees.  Trustees 
are subject to strict fiduciary duties of impartiality and ac-
countability which, due to a quirk of medieval history, were en-
forced by a separate ecclesiastic court system known as Courts 
of Equity.97  Fiduciary duties are triggered whenever there is a 
separation of ownership from management of property98 and, 
thus, easily carried over to the obligations of company and cor-
  
 94. In 1975, the new Canada Business Corporations Act had introduced a 
provision making audit committees mandatory for federal publicly traded 
companies.  Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 44 § 171 (1975).  
The interesting twist here is that, although inspired in many respects by the 
U.S. Model Business Corporations Act, the Canadian legislation was also sub-
ject to the beneficent influences of the Quebec Civil Code (itself at that time 
based largely on the French Napoleonic Code), in terms of legislative approach 
and drafting techniques, and with its continental European bias in favor of 
written law, ex ante public legal rules. 
 95. See generally Allison Dabbs Garrett, Themes and Variations: The Con-
vergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 DENV. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 147 (2004) (discussing global corporate governance prac-
tices).   
 96. See Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11 (1867). 
 97. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 6–8 (3rd ed. 2002).  
 98. See FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1299–1364 (Lawrence W. Waggoner et al. eds., 2002).  
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porate directors.  Enforced by the Courts of Equity, fiduciary 
duties were suffused with moral righteousness and legal sensi-
bilities.  A voluntary code for directors’ duties (in the Oxford 
English Dictionary sense of a vehicle establishing “a standard of 
moral behaviour”),99 such as the Combined Code, is very much 
in keeping with the constructs of this tradition. 
The specificity to the United Kingdom of the choice of a vol-
untary code of corporate governance should be obvious by now.  
The question then becomes how effective such voluntary codes 
could be elsewhere.  Would they transplant well, even if not im-
posed through conquest or colonization?100  Could they be trans-
planted at all in continental European law systems or the com-
plex hybrid legal systems of Asia?  For example, it would be 
hard to imagine the French (or Americans, for that matter) jet-
tisoning their beloved constitution for a variant of English par-
liamentary convention.101  Further, why have voluntary codes of 
corporate governance been so immensely popular? 
F. Voluntary Codes and International Capital Markets 
Here is where the capital markets may, ironically, be produc-
ing a perverse effect on corporate governance initiatives.  Inter-
national capital markets have been so dominated in recent 
years by Anglo-American law and practices that the spillover 
into other law and practice, regardless of legal tradition, has 
  
 99. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 441 (5th ed. 2002).   
 100. See BERKOWITZ ET AL., supra note 9. 
 101. The sorry saga of the recent Russian code of corporate governance 
demonstrates the muddle which follows an attempt to integrate a voluntary 
code into a continental European system unable to recognize the concept.  See 
Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48, at 349  
(“Russia’s new code of corporate governance had a more dirigiste 
provenance than Mexico’s….A committee selected by the FCSM [Rus-
sian Federal Commission on Securities Markets] was assigned the 
task of preparing a final code within a year….As initially conceived, 
the code was to be a (quite lengthy) compendium of existing law, 
regulation, and FCSM interpretation, as well as ‘recommended’ prac-
tices not necessarily grounded in the existing legal and regulatory 
framework.  An early draft of some of the code’s chapters indicated 
that the document would not likely be very clear about which of its 
provisions were restatements of existing law, which represented 
FCSM interpretation of the existing framework, and which were to be 
regarded as merely hortatory.”).  
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been inevitable, if uneven.  Some spillover may be ineffective 
because the mechanisms introduced are incompatible with or 
unknown to the underlying legal system, fiduciary duties for 
example.  In other cases, the transplanted legal concepts may 
contradict civil or commercial code provisions.  The newly-
introduced elements may then be simply trumped, rendered 
ineffective, by older civil code (or even constitutional) provisions 
which are higher in the legal hierarchy. 
Other legal mechanisms, voluntary codes possibly among 
them, may be detrimental to developing better corporate gov-
ernance.  Deliberately introducing an ineffective, but interna-
tionally recognized, corporate governance delivery mechanism 
such as a voluntary code may cause political interests to divert 
attention from approaches which could be more effective, but 
also more disruptive to the cozy corporate and political status 
quo.102  Such strategies are not restricted to developing econo-
mies.  The German corporate governance code, a voluntary code 
introduced in 2002, provides an example.  Justice Minister 
Herta Daubler-Gmelin “argued that while the code contained no 
sanctions for non-compliance, ‘the capital market will provide 
very effective sanctions’ for those that chose to ignore it.”103  The 
Financial Times editorial writer was skeptical at the time of 
introduction of the voluntary code, stating flatly that it would 
do “little to nudge German corporate governance towards a 
more investor-friendly model.”104  This skepticism has been 
largely vindicated by subsequent events; three years later the 
voluntary code is considered “a failure” and plans are afoot to 
replace it with written legislation.105 
  
 102. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 8. 
 103. Sven Clausen & Hugh Williamson, Berlin Announces Voluntary Busi-
ness Code, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 7. 
 104. German Takeover, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 12  
(“Common rules for corporate takeovers have become a test for Europe’s ca-
pacity to reform itself.  Thanks to the conservatism of German business and 
the refusal of the Berlin government to look beyond narrow political interests, 
is one that Europe is likely to fail.  Despite the eye-catching call for greater 
disclosure of executive pay, Germany’s new voluntary code, published yester-
day, does little to nudge German corporate governance towards a more inves-
tor-friendly model.”). 
 105. See Patrick Jenkins & Hugh Williamson, Executives Under Pressure on 
Pay, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at 16 
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On the other hand, as ineffective as such a mechanism may 
be domestically in directly raising standards of corporate gov-
ernance, it may have a signaling effect in the international 
markets.  To the extent corporations participate in the interna-
tional capital markets (perhaps only a tiny fraction of a coun-
try’s corporate universe), other more effective corporate govern-
ance mechanisms would be engaged through foreign listing 
rules, compliance with U.S. securities laws and regulations, 
inter alia.  Where there is little interest in international capital 
markets, however, there may be little interest in triggering the 
signaling effect of introduction of a domestically inappropriate, 
but internationally recognized, corporate governance mecha-
nism.106  
G. Cumulative Voting and Class Actions 
Like voluntary codes, cumulative voting mechanisms and 
class actions have also popped up around the world.107  Early 
LLSV literature, which identified the presence of both of these 
  
(“A group of 21 Social Democrat members of the German parliament 
will today table a draft bill to force company executives to disclose de-
tails of their remuneration and bring to an end a deep-rooted culture 
of secrecy in the country’s boardrooms.  The bill, drafted in consulta-
tion with corporate governance expert Theodor Baums, comes in re-
sponse to what the legislators see as the failure of a three-year-old 
voluntary code to prompt disclosure.”). 
 106. Tunisia, for example, with a very “pure” French civil law tradition, has 
recently introduced new corporate law designed to improve various aspects of 
governance, but has little interest in a voluntary code of good corporate gov-
ernance (although there is some greater interest in judicially oriented statu-
tory shareholder remedies).  See, e.g., Code des sociétés commerciales, Loi no. 
2000-93 du 3 novembre 2000, art. 477.  As the head of the Centre des etudes 
juridiques et judiciaries explained to the author in an interview in Tunis in 
February 2001, the concept of a voluntary code of corporate governance is 
inconsistent with the Tunisian legal tradition which prefers structural ad-
justments to the corporate law, ex ante public legal rules.  To the extent there 
is little interest in participating in international capital markets by Tunisian 
corporations (non-domestic activity is more likely to be focused on France and 
Italy), there is little need to send a signal to the international capital markets. 
 107. See, e.g., Sang-Woo Nam & Il Chong Nam, Corporate Governance in 
Asia: Recent Evidence from Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Ma-
laysia, Asian Development Bank Institute (2004), available at http:// 
www.adbi.org/files/2003.11.10.paper.recent.evidence.pdf#search='SangWoo%2
0Nam,%20Il%20Chong%20Nam' (last updated May 20, 2005). 
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so called “anti-director” mechanisms as indicative of the pres-
ence of effective corporate governance regimes, has no doubt 
been influential in this regard.108  Statutory cumulative voting 
and class actions originated in the United States and are proce-
dural mechanisms (note their procedural nature) designed to 
enhance minority shareholder representation at the board level, 
on the one hand, and promote management accountability 
through judicial recourse, on the other. 
Again, the primary virtue of such governance mechanisms is 
their signaling effect to international capital markets.  U.S in-
stitutional investors recognize the signal, which means the do-
mestic market has become aware of and taken up the corporate 
governance debate.109  Cumulative voting and class actions are 
like little flags attracting the momentary attention of the inter-
national capital markets.  As effective mechanisms of promoting 
better governance in the corporate sector domestically, however, 
they will likely prove disappointing.  First of all, cumulative 
voting in particular, does little to promote corporate governance 
even in the United States.  Secondly, as transplants, both 
mechanisms may prove to be the wrong form of legal rule for 
most of the legal systems in which they find themselves.  In ad-
dition, these mechanisms may have been transplanted by a 
method (i.e. imposed rather than voluntarily adopted) likely to 
result in their failure to perform as expected.110 
  
 108. See supra note 2. 
 109. The author participated in a “road show” meeting in New York City in 
2002 where the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) was making a presen-
tation to major U.S. institutional investors on its new corporate governance 
board, the Novo Mercado.  One institutional investor inquired as to whether 
Brazil had cumulative voting provisions in its corporate law (it didn’t).  What 
the investor failed to realize, and what the BOVESPA failed to mention, was 
that pending legislation in Brazil was to provide a mechanism for direct board 
representation by minority shareholders holding a certain percentage of 
shares, in fact, a much better, substantive right than a cumulative voting 
mechanism.  For a more detailed description of the Novo Mercado, see Jordan 
& Lubrano, supra note 48, at 341. 
 110. Adoption of cumulative voting and class actions has often been highly 
recommended or otherwise “imposed” by international financial institutions.  
See, e.g., Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and 
their Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 328 
(2000) (“Furthermore, Korea is facing considerable peer pressure from inter-
national organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (‘OECD’) to modify its corporate regulation to reflect newly 
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The introduction of cumulative voting and class actions in 
Korea provides an example of such failure.  The Korean legal 
system, at its most formal level, has been strongly influenced 
historically by German models (originally via Japan) and, for 
that reason, would demonstrate a predilection for ex ante public 
legal rules, written law.111  As in the other legal systems with 
which Korea shares its heritage, procedural rules and reliance 
on ex post public legal rules, judicial recourse, are limited in 
their effectiveness.  For example, in Korea, the “Commercial 
Code provision governing derivative actions [another U.S. pro-
cedural transplant relying on judicial action] for practical pur-
poses has been dead paper.”112 
An additional complication in the case of Korean corporate 
law has been the ongoing dysfunctionalities associated with ear-
lier transplants from U.S. law: 
Most of the faults in Korean corporations can be traced to the 
failure of the corporate regulatory framework.  In essence, the 
management structure established to oversee business firms 
did not function as expected.  Corporate actors, such as share-
holders, the board of directors, representative directors, and 
auditors, did not fulfill their respective statutory duties.  One 
expert describes the anomalous situation whereby Korean 
boards would monitor themselves as being functionally in be-
tween the dual-board system or two-tier system of Germany, 
and the single board or one-tier system of the United States.113  
  
emerging international standards.”).  According to Pistor, the degree of impo-
sition of a transplanted legal rule correlates to the likelihood of failure of the 
rule.  PISTOR, supra note 3, at 2.  Current corporate governance endeavors 
eerily hark back to similar efforts at imposition of foreign transplants in the 
post WW II era in Japan.  See Kim, supra, at 277 n.13 (quoting Thomas I. 
Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions: Con-
cerning Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 12, 15–16 (1953)).  
 111. “Although Korea hails from the German civil law tradition, it is not a 
legal requirement that employees can elect a board member of the company.”  
Hasung Jang & Joongi Kim, Korea Country Paper: The Role of Boards and 
Stakeholders in Corporate Governance, THE THIRD OECD ASIAN ROUNDTABLE 
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Singapore, Apr. 4–6, 2001.  Like Japan, Korea 
demonstrates significant U.S. influences in its statutory law, and some of its 
financial institutions. 
 112. Chul-Song Lee, So-soo-joo-joo-gwon-ui shil-hyo-sung gum-to [Review of 
the Effectiveness of Minority Shareholder Rights], 35 SANG-JANG-HYUP 7, 7 
(1997), cited in Kim, supra note 110, at 282 n.34.  
 113. Kim, supra note 110, at 277–78. 
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The legacy of ill-conceived, poorly indigenized, legal trans-
plants persisted over decades, the structure finally cracking 
under the pressures of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, according 
to Joongi Kim.  It is thus terribly ironic that solutions proposed 
in the wake of the crisis, such as cumulative voting, are simi-
larly ill-conceived transplants.  
Cumulative voting is a curious rule.  It smacks of private le-
gal rules, election procedures at, say, the bridge club or the 
country club.  In the United States, its “application to share-
holder voting is a path-dependent historical oddity.”114  It is a 
procedural voting mechanism, and a cumbersome one at that,115 
under which minority shareholders have a chance (but only a 
chance) for some degree of representation on the board of direc-
tors.116  There is no statutory right to direct representation on 
the board.  Although cumulative voting might be moderately 
useful in achieving its purposes in a corporation with a small 
number of shareholders, or one with another form of concen-
trated ownership, in such cases there are usually better mecha-
nisms available.117 
Cumulative voting was designed as a compensatory mecha-
nism to override the principle of majority rule, whereby a ma-
  
 114. The accepted story of the introduction of cumulative voting in the 
United States is truly a bit bizarre:   
As part of the Illinois constitutional revision of 1870, adherents of 
proportional representation won a major battle to require cumulative 
voting for the Illinois House of Representatives.  The principle having 
prevailed, the constitutional convention also required cumulative vot-
ing in the election of directors for private corporations.  The objective 
was to protect minority interests against overreaching by a majority, 
particularly in circumstances in which representation on the board 
would give the minority the information necessary to police against 
fraud.  
Jeffrey Gordon, Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 124, 142 (1994). 
 115. “One undesirable aspect of cumulative voting is that it tends to be a 
little tricky.  If a shareholder casts votes in an irrational or inefficient way, he 
may not get the directorships his position entitles him to; when voting cumu-
latively it is relatively easy to make a mistake in spreading votes around.”  
ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATIONS 534 (8th ed. 2003). 
 116. For a historical analysis of cumulative voting, see Gordon, supra note 
114. 
 117. Shareholder agreements and the use of voting groups, for example. 
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jority shareholder, through voting procedures, could elect an 
entire slate to the board of a U.S. corporation.118  In the United 
States, the original statutory formulation became a mandatory 
feature in many state laws.119  Over time, however, partly in re-
sponse to the shift to more manager-friendly corporate laws in 
the United States, cumulative voting started to slip back into 
the realm of private legal rules; it remained a feature of corpo-
rate statutes, but was made optional in most states.120  Thus, 
cumulative voting was made permissive, not mandatory, in 
most states and ultimately left to determination in the corpo-
rate charter.121  German corporate law, on the other hand, has 
long provided a statutory mechanism to ensure direct supervi-
sory board representation by certain constituencies—a statu-
tory right to direct representation.122  
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea 
acted quickly to re-establish confidence in its markets.123  
  
 118. For a description of the operation of cumulative voting, see HAMILTON 
& MACEY, supra note 115, at 534. 
 119. See Gordon, supra note 114. 
 120. Id. at 155–60.  See also HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 115, at 541  
(“Under the MBCA [Model Business Corporations Act], cumulative 
voting, like preemptive rights, is an ‘opt in’ election to be chosen by 
an appropriate provision in the articles of incorporation.  As of 1998, 
thirty states had adopted an ‘opt in’ provision while twelve states had 
an ‘opt out’ election.  Eight states make cumulative voting mandatory 
for all corporations, five by provision in state constitutions.  The 
number of states with mandatory cumulative voting, however, is de-
clining.  In 1990 California, long the bastion of mandatory cumulative 
voting, made that manner of voting permissive for corporations with 
shares listed on a public exchange or with more than 800 sharehold-
ers of record.”). 
 121. Gordon posits two propositions for the demise of cumulative voting in 
the United States:  “The evidence suggests two very different hypotheses: one 
holds that cumulative voting fell victim to a managerial race to the bottom; 
the other posits that cumulative voting, even if once useful, came to interfere 
with good governance.”  Gordon, supra note 114, at 141–42 (emphasis added). 
 122. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 892 (“In Germany, under the 
system of Mitbestimmung  (co-determination), workers elect normally one 
third of the supervisory board.”). 
 123. As Kim points out, 
The 1997 financial crisis exposed a wide range of structural weak-
nesses in Korea’s economy.  International organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”), in particular, criti-
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Among other things, waves of corporate law reforms were en-
acted, some at the suggestion of international financial institu-
tions such as The World Bank and the IMF, with cumulative 
voting provisions among them.  The cumulative voting rules 
adopted, though, were of the “weak,” or quasi-public, variety.  
They were not mandatory in that they could be bypassed 
through amendments to the corporate charter.  Although some 
Korean academics had queried, prior to enactment, the effec-
tiveness of these “optional” or “default” rules,124 they had been 
advised that this was a modern formulation of the rule as found 
in the United States.  
As a result, Korean corporations moved quickly, and pre-
dictably, to neutralize cumulative voting rules by charter 
amendments, rendering the statutory rules ineffective.125  But 
then, cumulative voting was inherently ineffective in any case, 
as it so proved in Korea.  “Even among those companies that 
have not excluded [cumulative voting] and…therefore must fol-
low it, to date there have been no reports that a company has 
elected a director through cumulative voting.”126 
  
cized Korea’s corporate sector and blamed ineffective corporate regu-
lation as a major cause of the crisis….In return for receiving their fi-
nancial assistance, Korea enacted another round of extensive 
amendments to its corporate laws on December 28, 1998….Finally, on 
December 31, 1999, several additional amendments were enacted.   
Kim, supra note 110, at 276. 
 124. Conversation with Hasung Jang, Director, Asian Institute of Corporate 
Governance, Korea University Business School, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 
2000). 
 125. See Jang & Kim, supra note 111. 
 126. Id. at 3  
(“As of 1998, cumulative voting has become an option for companies.  
Unfortunately, from a policy standpoint, it has remained largely inef-
fective.  The problem lies in that when the Commercial Code was 
amended to allow cumulative voting the new law also included a pro-
vision that permits companies to exclude it through their articles of 
incorporation.  (CC382-2).  As a result, as of November 2000, 77.6% of 
all listed companies have adopted provisions in their articles that 
specifically exclude cumulative voting.…The new SEC has attempted 
to ameliorate this situation by requiring that shareholders with at 
least one percent of the voting stock can request cumulative voting.  
(SEC 191-18).  This substantially lowers the previous holding re-
quirement of three percent that still applies to non-listed companies.  
The new SEC also tries to reverse the trend of excluding cumulative 
voting and has stopped just short of mandating it.”). 
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Wrong rule, wrong form of rule.  A German-style rule provid-
ing for direct board representation, a substantive right rather 
than a dubious procedural mechanism, would likely have been 
more compatible with the underlying German framework of the 
corporate law (even as it had become denatured by earlier U.S. 
transplants)127 and, thus, more effective.  Some commentators 
had actually suggested a more German style rule, but did not 
prevail.128  And, if an effective cumulative voting rule had still 
been the desired result, a mandatory statutory provision would 
have been more effective.129 
However, the overriding question of whether cumulative vot-
ing actually promotes better corporate governance, even in the 
United States, has never been satisfactorily answered.130  Cumu-
lative voting does appear, in its “weak” or “optional” form, in 
most state statutes in the United States.  Its operation is dis-
cussed, sometimes at length, in U.S. law texts.131  In other 
words, the cumulative voting mechanism is a visible tip of the 
iceberg.  However, cumulative voting rights are not very effec-
tive as a minority shareholder protection mechanism under any 
circumstances, and particularly not in a listed or publicly-
  
 127. With respect to the adoption of the U.S.-style board of directors in 
Japanese law, it was said at the time, “On a Commercial Code of continental 
origin, there have been forcibly grafted certain limbs of alien, Anglo-American 
origin.”  Kim, supra note 111, at 277 n.13 (quoting Thomas I. Blakemore & 
Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions: Concerning Corpora-
tions, 2 AM. J. COMP. L 12, 15–16 (1953)).  
 128. According to Kim,  
One observer argues that Korea is not ready for the cumulative vot-
ing system because it will create confusion...Choi proposes instead a 
new system of corporate governance whereby 50% of the board would 
be elected as before, 35% would be elected with each shareholder’s 
voting rights being limited to a maximum of 3%, and the remaining 
25% would be elected by large creditors….For companies with more 
than 10,000 workers, a representative from the workers would be 
elected.   
Kim, supra note 110, at 295 n.107. 
 129. Jang & Kim, supra note 111. 
 130. Gordon, supra note 114, at 127 (“[T]he evidence is far from clear that 
cumulative voting increases aggregate shareholder welfare across all firms at 
all times.”).  
 131. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 124. 
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traded U.S. corporation.132  Since the greater corporate govern-
ance debate implicates only publicly traded corporations, cumu-
lative voting rights are thus more or less irrelevant.133  Cumula-
tive voting provisions are fossils trapped in the bedrock of U.S. 
corporate statutes. 
This raises the question of how cumulative voting provisions 
gained international prominence as a corporate governance 
mechanism.  The highly regarded and influential LLSV studies 
are a likely culprit.134  In the difficult search to isolate economet-
ric indicia of shareholder protections, the statutory provisions 
in U.S. corporate law on cumulative voting were visible and ac-
cessible.  That cumulative voting rights, as a minority share-
holder protection, were irrelevant to publicly-traded corpora-
tions in the United States was not immediately obvious.135  The 
  
 132. Irrespective of whether cumulative voting mechanisms are available, 
minority shareholder voting rights in U.S. publicly-traded corporations are 
largely illusory.  Unlike many other places in the world (including the UK and 
continental Europe), the residual authority in a corporation does not reside in 
the general meeting of shareholders. In particular, the control of the nomina-
tion process by the directors themselves, together with management control of 
the proxy voting process in the United States, means that minority share-
holder voting rights count for very little. Shareholders may only vote for (or 
abstain from voting for) the slate of directors put before them by management: 
[T]here is one big problem with demanding more activism from 
shareholders; their votes in America are still largely worthless, as 
this season’s proxy season, which has just begun, will show once 
again.  Despite all the talk in America about shareholder democracy 
and ownership, shareholder resolutions, even if backed by a majority, 
are rarely binding on management.  In many cases, managers can 
even stop a resolution from being put to a vote.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission recently proposed a tiny rule change to make 
it slightly easier for shareholders to nominate candidates for election 
to boards of directors.  Lobbyists representing America’s top bosses 
easily and unceremoniously killed the proposal. 
Bossing the Bosses, ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 2005, at 13.  
 133. Mark Roe notes, “Wall Street lawyers might have reservations about 
heavily using preemptive rights, cumulative voting and the minimum per-
centage needed to call a special shareholders meeting—items not likely to  be 
near the top of most American lawyers’ lists of Delaware corporate law’s most 
important legal protections.”  MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 29 n.37 
(Colum. Law School, Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 186, 
Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=260582 (last visited May 20, 2005). 
 134. See supra note 2. 
 135. Except to Wall Street lawyers, perhaps. 
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complexity and dynamism of legal systems present difficult 
challenges for econometric analysis.   
However, it gets worse:  the “defect” in the cumulative voting 
provision in Korea was “fixed.”136  A form of mandatory cumula-
tive voting has proven to be worse than merely irrelevant for 
Korean corporations with voting shares trading in the United 
States.  It is virtually impossible to reconcile mandatory cumu-
lative voting provisions with the already difficult U.S. proxy 
voting rules and practices for publicly-traded corporations.137  
Further, like most other non-U.S. issuers,138 shares of Korean 
corporations will usually be traded through a derivative form of 
security, known as American Depository Receipts, thus adding 
further devilish complexity to the voting process.139 
H. Class Actions 
Class actions present even less likelihood of effectiveness as a 
governance mechanism in most transitional and emerging mar-
kets.  At least with cumulative voting, there would be a chance 
of developing rules that could, technically, work in the context 
of corporate legislation to which they were not native.  Class 
actions, however, depend upon the existence of an experienced 
judiciary, an extensive network of other procedural rules, an 
active body of litigation professionals and, in terms of particular 
legal sensibilities, a general populace with a litigious bent.140  
  
 136. See JANG & KIM, supra note 111. 
 137. As noted supra Section VI(g), the vast majority of U.S. publicly-traded 
corporations do not have cumulative voting provisions, so the proxy voting 
rules are not designed to take them into account. 
 138. Canadian and Israeli issuers being notable exceptions. 
 139. For example, refer to the 2005 U.S. proxy materials for KT (formerly 
known as  Korea Telecom Corp.) which has American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs) trading in the United States.  (Proxy materials on file with author).  
The complexity of the voting procedures, resulting from the use of cumulative 
voting, would astonish a U.S. issuer of publicly traded securities.  In the case 
of KT, it is interesting to note that cumulative voting was at the behest of its 
labor union.  “Under the Korean Commercial Code and Securities Exchange 
Act, anyone who holds more than 1% of shares of KT with voting rights can 
request cumulative voting.  In this case, Mr. Ji Jae Shik, a shareholder, re-
quested cumulative voting on February 23, 2005.  Please note that this re-
quest process was actually initiated by KT Labor Union.” 
 140. See generally HON. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS 
TORT LITIGATIONS: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER 
MULTI-PARTY DEVICES (1995). 
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Class actions form part of the body of procedural law, in the 
great common law tradition of no right (or wrong) without a 
remedy. 
So-called “class action” provisions dropped into otherwise 
substantive corporate law of a transitional or emerging market 
economy would arrive dead on arrival.  There would be no pro-
cedural rules or institutions to support them, much less the in-
clination to make use of them, were such rules to develop.141 
VII. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
Following a dozen or so years of “a massive process of change 
in adherence to legal information,” as H. Patrick Glenn puts it, 
a huge, slow, process of digestion and “indigenization” is now 
ongoing.142  Like a boa constrictor enjoying a good meal, there is 
no doubt that in certain places, at certain times, some bits may 
be spat out or pass through without leaving a trace.  There is 
equally little doubt that what is ingested will be transformed by 
the process. 
In terms of mobilizing the forces of the capital markets effec-
tively to raise standards of governance in corporations, the 
Latin American experience may be particularly instructive.143  
The initiatives differ among themselves, depending on various 
factors such as prevailing forms of corporate ownership and 
capital structure.  Not every initiative may be directly transfer-
able elsewhere in all cases, but there may be positive lessons to 
be learned. 
  
 141. Between 1998 and 2002, there were only thirteen suits filed by minor-
ity shareholders in Korea.  See supra note 44. 
One recent reform intended to impose discipline on managers and 
majority shareholders is the availability of class action suits. The new 
law passed by the National Assembly, the Securities Related Class 
Action Law, will allow shareholders to file class actions from January 
1, 2005, in respect of companies with Won 2 trillion or more in as-
sets…. 
Kyung Taek Jung & Hwa Soo Chung, Korea Aims for World Class Corporate 
Governance, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, available at http://www.legalmedia 
group.com/iflr/default.asp?Page=1&SID=5710&F=F. 
 142. See generally Legrand, supra note 20. 
 143. For more detailed analysis of Latin American initiatives in corporate 
governance, see Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48. 
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Latin Americans are proving adept at legal transplantation 
because they have the advantage of proximity and exposure to 
North American law, markets and practices.  For example, both 
Mexico and Quebec, French civil code jurisdictions, can fear-
lessly introduce Anglo-American trust law concepts, and make 
them work, because they understand the principles and have a 
long history of familiarity with them.  Further, the integration 
of the North and South American capital markets means that 
Latin Americans want to make the new concepts work, a good 
predictor of effectiveness according to Pistor.144  In addition, 
capital market integration along this north/south axis is well 
advanced and the international signaling imperative is at 
work.145  Further, Latin Americans are introducing governance 
mechanisms in multiple guises along the continuum of private 
and public legal rules in order to amplify the prospects of effec-
tiveness. 
Brazil’s initiatives are particularly interesting in moving con-
tractual governance mechanisms (private legal rules) into the 
listing rules (semi-public legal rules) and then backing them 
with corresponding legislative changes (ex ante public legal 
rules).  The BOVESPA’s Novo Mercado has elicited attention 
elsewhere.146  It may prove to be good vehicle for maximizing the 
effectiveness of capital markets forces on the governance of cor-
porations.  Time will tell. 
Of course, these observations have been based on recent, but 
past, experiences.  There are now several new factors to con-
sider.  The corporate governance scandals in the United States 
have shaken confidence in the old, familiar mechanisms of capi-
tal market and corporate governance.147  The formal, public re-
sponse to the scandals, embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley legisla-
tion,148 is more a symptom than a solution.  New approaches are 
  
 144. See PISTOR, supra note 3.  
 145. See COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 4. 
 146. The Jakarta Stock Exchange, for example, and its capital markets 
regulator, BAPEPAM, for example, were interested in the Brazilian experi-
ence.  
 147. The Enron and WorldCom scandals being the most prominent, and the 
proximate cause of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  See Mark J. Roe, Dela-
ware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 558 (2003).  
 148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
[hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. 
File: Jordan.MACRO.06.16.05.doc Created on: 6/16/2005 3:26 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:35 PM 
2005] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1027 
appearing elsewhere, notably in Europe.149  Europe is also pro-
viding new models of capital market regulation, controversial 
and untested though they may be, in the form of the EU Pro-
spectus Directive, for example, which comes into effect in July 
2005.  Revitalized European stock markets, together with a new 
pan-European regulatory structure, may be more compatible 
with and change the dynamics of the legal systems of any num-
ber of countries.  And finally, could it be that an older style of 
commercial morality and heightened legal sensibilities are 
creeping back into U.S. boardrooms?150 
 
  
 149.  
If William Donaldson is looking for ways to shake up the U.S. stock 
markets, as the Securities and Exchange Commission chairman ap-
pears poised to consider, he might want to look at Europe.  Euro-
pean’s [sic] stock markets have their own flaws, but in the past dec-
ade have taken just the kind of steps to electronic and cheap ex-
changes overseen by independent regulators that could now be in 
play in the U.S.  The pressure for change in the U.S. markets comes 
in the wake of an outcry over the perceived lack of corporate govern-
ance at the New York Stock Exchange and the forced resignation of 
its chief executive, Dick Grasso.   
Model Market Could be in Europe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at C14.  
 150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act does require disclosure of whether reporting corpo-
rations have an ethics committee.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406.  See also 
Boeing Chief Quits Over Affair, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at 1  
(“Harry Stonecipher, the man brought out of retirement to restore 
Boeing’s reputation, was ousted as chief executive yesterday for hav-
ing an affair with a female executive. The departure is a serious blow 
to Boeing, which is working hard to restore its reputation.  A series of 
executives has left under a cloud….The episode also raises questions 
about how far corporate ethics should reach into personal lives.”). 
